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Terry v. Ohio at 50: What It Created, What It
has Meant, is It Under Attack and is the Court
Opening the Door to Police Misconduct?
Jeffrey D. Swartz, Esq.1
Fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court issued their opinion in
Terry v. Ohio. The underpinnings of this decision became the bedrock of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This article re-examines that decision,
and its effect on the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
What is the lasting effect, if any, of Utah v. Strieff and Heien v. North Carolina on Terry? Ultimately, this article is designed to bring the issues forward, and challenge the reader to examine what appears to be innocuous
cases, the subtle attack on Terry's objective standards and the individual
protections the case created, and whether, after fifty years, is the court is
receding from Terry, and, in favor of a good faith exception.
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On June 10, 1968, the Supreme Court of the United States announced
its decision in Terry v. Ohio,2 universally considered the cornerstone of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on warrantless searches and seizures. The
case dealt with the commonly referred to police practice of “stop and
frisk.”3 The Court’s endorsement of that practice, albeit with significant
objective criteria for its implementation, set the stage for fifty years of decisions in which warrantless searches and seizures were expanded.
In this article we will look at the history, some of which is anecdotal,
which lead to the decision; the decision itself; the three doctrinal underpinnings of the decision; if there was a winner, who was it (not in the sense of
Mr. Terry and Mr. Chilton, the Petitioners in the case, for they clearly lost);
what did it mean to that winner; how and why Terry permeates almost every major Fourth Amendment precedent; what is the precedential value of
Terry today; and can it withstand the new attempts by the more conservative wing of the Court to diminish its core guidance.
I.

TERRY V. OHIO: THE HISTORY, THE DECISION, AND WHY.

In the early afternoon of October 31, 1963, Officer Joseph McFadden
(a thirty-nine year veteran of the City of Cleveland Police Department) was
performing his assigned duties as a plainclothes detective in downtown
Cleveland, Ohio.4 McFadden’s main duty was to patrol the streets of the
city looking for "shoplifters and pickpockets,"5 and to arrest offenders when
2.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3.
A frequently taught case in Criminal Law classes provides an example. See
generally People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927). The defendants were riding in an
automobile around a neighborhood in 1927 New York City allegedly looking for a particular
person they believed would be carrying a large amount of cash for a payroll. The police
spotted the car, and recognizing the occupants as being local troublemakers, stopped the car
in which the defendants were occupants. The four defendants attempted to flee on foot and
were seized by the police. One was found with a gun, and, although the facts of the case are
sketchy, it would seem that one of them told the police what they were doing. All were
charged with attempted robbery. Id. Although the case is taught as an example of the “dangerous proximity test” for attempts, invariably a student will ask, why the police stopped the
vehicle in the first place, if they did not know what the defendants were doing wrong? The
only answer one can give to a first term law student is that the courts tolerated these types of
stops in a result oriented way. There was no legal basis for the stop as we know the Fourth
Amendment today, but a gun was found and a defendant admitted to their goal and purpose.
4.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. One has to remember that in 1965 credit cards were more
the exception, not the norm. Personal computers did not exist. People purchased airline
tickets at the airport, through travel agents, or at outlet stores established by the airline in
major cities. Cash was the ordinary means of payment, and airline ticketing offices, of
course, had large amounts of cash from payments and money that was necessary to make
change on a purchase.
5.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 65.
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those crimes were observed: an assignment he had been performing for
approximately thirty years.6 When McFadden approached the corner of
Huron and Euclid, he saw two African-American males (John W. Terry and
Richard D. Chilton) standing on the opposite corner.7
As McFadden watched, each would separately walk in front of two
stores near that corner and would try to observe the activity inside a United
Airlines ticketing office.8 They repeated that process several times, after
which they were joined on the corner by a third person (Carl Katz, a Caucasian male)9. Katz, within moments, left Terry and Chilton, who then moved
from the corner they had all met to about one block west of Huron, where
Katz joined them shortly thereafter.10
At this point McFadden was “thoroughly suspicious.”11 He was convinced that the trio was "casing a job, a stick-up" (a robbery).12 Being concerned that "they may have a gun," McFadden approached all three, identified himself, and ordered all three to keep their hands out their pockets.
McFadden asked all three for their names and received mumbled responses.13
McFadden grabbed Terry and spun him around using him as a shield
against any action the other two suspects may take.14 The Court stated that
McFadden "patted down" the outer clothing Terry was wearing and felt
what he knew to be a gun.15 He was unable to retrieve the gun and ordered
Terry, Chilton, and Katz into a nearby store.16 After removing Terry's coat
and seizing the weapon, McFadden "patted down" the outer clothing of the
other two suspects, finding a gun in Mr. Chilton's pocket, but no weapon on
Katz.17
The Court was careful to note that it appeared from the record that
McFadden testified he was only checking to see if the men were armed, and
he never placed his hands beneath the outer clothing of any of the three
men.18 All three of the suspects were taken into custody and transported to
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
See JOSEPH MCFADDEN, "DEPARTMENTAL INFORMATION" POLICE REPORT, (Oct.
31, 1963).
9.
Id.
10.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. (McFadden described the encounter a little differently in his report. He did
not refer to a "pat-down," but a "search.").
18.
Id.
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police headquarters.19 Terry and Chilton were arrested and charged with
carrying a concealed firearm.20 Katz was released.21
A motion to suppress the guns was filed.22 At the hearing on the motion, the prosecution took a position that the “guns had been seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest.”23 The trial court, understanding the
circularity of such an argument, stated that it "would be stretching the facts
beyond reasonable comprehension" to find that Officer McFadden had
probable cause to arrest the men before he patted them down for weapons.24
Nonetheless, the trial court denied the motion to suppress on the basis
that McFadden “had reasonable cause to believe . . . that the defendants
were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation should be
made of their action.”25 The trial court went on to opine that McFadden had
the right for his own protection to pat down the outer clothing of the defendant because he had reasonable cause to believe they might be armed.26
In so doing, the trial court enumerated a distinction between an investigatory “stop” and an arrest, and between a “frisk” and a full-blown search for
evidence.27 The trial court recognized the existential threat to the officer in
such a situation.28
After a bench trial, Terry and Chilton were found guilty.29 Appeals to
the state appellate court and the Supreme Court of Ohio left the convictions
in place.30 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the simple question of whether the admission of the guns violated Terry’s “rights under the
Fourth Amendment as made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment”31
under Mapp v. Ohio.32
The Court set the table for its analysis by seizing upon the language
from its prior decisions of Katz v. United States33 that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”34 and Elkins v. United States,35 “what the
19.
20.
21.
31, 1963).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 1, 7.
Id.
See JOSEPH MCFADDEN, "DEPARTMENTAL INFORMATION" POLICE REPORT, (Oct.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures.”36 These rights of personal security are as important
to the person on the street as to any person carrying on his personal affairs
within his home.37
Before Terry the only recognized exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment was search incident to a lawful arrest.38 This
venerable doctrine relates as far back as “old English common law.”39
However, police had been engaging in non-consensual, warrantless searches and seizures in a practice known as “stop and frisk” of suspicious persons.40
The Court recognized the ongoing debate over this police tactic.41 The
Court however dismissed the notion of the issue just being an abstract question of the State having a right to confront suspects on the street, but being
one of the admissibility of evidence uncovered by the search and seizure.42
It was clear that two competing interests were in need of reconciliation. Those interests were the need for effective law enforcement (governmental interest) and the degree of the intrusion upon personal security.43
The State of Ohio argued the Court should adopt the trial court’s distinction between a “stop” (or seizure) and an “arrest” of a person, and a
“frisk” and a “search.”44 Their justification, in part, was based “upon the
notion that a stop and frisk amounted to a minor inconvenience and petty
indignity,” which should be allowed “in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police officer’s suspicion.”45
On the other side of the argument was “the authority of the police must
be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it had developed
to that date.”46 Terry urged that there was, and should not be, a differentiation of police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary
cooperation of a person, “and yet stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause.”47

36.
Id. at 222.
37.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
38.
Fremont Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that a search
conducted incident to a lawful arrest was one of the earliest exceptions to the warrant requirement as recognized by the Supreme Court).
39.
Id.
40.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 12.
43.
Id. at 11.
44.
Id. at 10.
45.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
46.
Id. at 8.
47.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
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Terry argued that any acquiescence by the Court to the compulsion inherent in a stop and frisk “would constitute an abdication of judicial control
over substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police
officers,” [whose sole interest is in] “ferreting out crime.”48
Conceding an apparent inability of the courts to supervise each and
every law enforcement situation that arises between the police and the public, the Court raised the specter49 of the application of the exclusionary rule
as the “principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.”50 Using the
words of Mapp, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule was “the only
effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context . . . [and
without it the] guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizure would
be a mere ‘form of words’.”51
Before determining whether stop and frisk should be outside the application of the exclusionary rule, the Court had to decide whether that action
fell within the confines of the Fourth Amendment.52 The Court emphatically rejected the notion that it did.53 Simply put, the Fourth Amendment is
involved anytime a person is seized.54 “It must be recognized whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has seized that person.”55
The Court went on to find that the action of the “pat down” is nothing
short of a search and more than a petty indignity.56 “It is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and
arouse strong resentment, and it is not to undertaken lightly.”57
With all of this, the Court clearly rejected the State’s notion that it
should differentiate “stop” from “arrest” and “frisk” from “search.”58 The
implications were clear that to do so would isolate such actions from constitutional scrutiny.59
With the conduct of Officer McFadden relating to Mr. Terry clearly
within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, it now fell upon the Court to
determine whether that action passed the test of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and sei48.
Id. at 12.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. (citing Richard M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 393 (1963)).
56.
Id.
57.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
58.
Id.
59.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
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zures.60 In so doing the Court set forth a dual inquiry: Whether the action
“was justified at its inception,” and “whether it was related in scope to the
circumstances, which justified the interference in the first place.”61
“Simple good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.”62
“If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects only in the discretion of the police.”63
“The police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts,
which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably
warrant that intrusion.”64
In answering this question, the Court created what is commonly referred to as the “Terry Balancing Test.” Taking its recent ruling in Camara
v. Court of City and County of San Francisco,65 the Court defined this dual
inquiry as one in which the courts must balance “the governmental interest
(which allegedly justifies official intrusion) against the intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen.”66 The Court noted
that there was no ready test other than balancing the need to search against
the degree of that intrusion.67
The Court then considered what it believed to be the governmental interests involved in “stop and frisk cases.” That general interest was, of
course, effective crime prevention and detection. That is the ability of the
police “in appropriate circumstances, and in an appropriate manner, to approach a person for purposes of investigating” possible criminal activity,
even where probable cause does not exist.68
But even after disposing of whether the governmental interest existed
and was well served by McFadden’s actions by analyzing the facts and determining that it was, the Court then had to deal with the “crux” of the
case.69 It was not the propriety of McFadden’s seizure of Terry to investigate the matter, but whether “there was justification for the invasion of Ter-

60.
Id. at 19-20.
61.
Id. (Emphasis added).
62.
Id. at 22.
63.
Id. (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
64.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (Emphasis added).
65.
Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (“To
apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen.”).
66.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 22.
69.
Id. at 11.
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ry’s personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that
investigation.”70
Refusing to eschew the need of a police officer’s need to protect himself and others, where they may lack probable cause, the Court established
the standard that “when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or others,” it is “unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact armed.”71
Taking into consideration the constitutional limitation of “scope” of a
search the Court dealt with the nature and quality of the “intrusion.” Recognizing that even a search of outer clothing is a severe intrusion, the concept of duration of the intrusion sneaks into the analysis, when the Court
describes the intrusion as “brief.”72 They use this same verbiage in describing the “protective” search for weapons “constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of a person.”73
Thus, for the first time, the concept of “scope and duration” as standards for a search and seizure are applied. The application of duration will
become the subject of later cases designed to provide a definition of “duration” in Fourth Amendment terms.
Ultimately, the Court held “that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating” and in order to dispel concerns of his safety and the safety of
others, he is entitled to conduct a limited search of the outer clothing of the
individual in an attempt to discover weapons.74
Out of Terry, three basic analyses, which have been the basis of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence for fifty years, are evident. They are an objective
standard test of “reasonable and articulable suspicion,” the Terry Balancing
Test and ultimately the concept that a search can be limited in duration.
Clearly, the Court had concern for societal conditions in the late
1960’s and 1970’s. In the opinion the Court states:
American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this county many law enforcement
officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more
are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 23.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added).
Id. at 30.
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portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives. In
view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they
may lack probable cause . . . .75
As stated by Arnold Loewy, then Associate Professor of Law at the
University of North Carolina, “It would seem that such a novel holding can
be explained only by a concern in the Court for providing the police with as
much leeway as possible in their fight against crime.”76 As noted in the
statistical reports referenced below, the Sixties were a decade of increased
violent crime.77 This was due to increased social pressures (Viet Nam War
protests) and civil rights inequities.78 Lack of direction by the Court, and
the abuses of the police in exercising their authority, were met with violence, not only toward the general public, but the police directly.
The decision drew outrage from civil libertarians and criminal defense
attorneys alike who felt it was extra constitutional and an infringement on
the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.79 It was praised by law
enforcement as vindication for good police work and a justification for further action.80 That praise was not unanimous, in that some police felt the
standards established in Terry were unnecessary, cumbersome, and complex.
Fred E. Inbrau and James R. Thompson of Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement, Inc., an organization founded for the purpose of filing an
amicus curiae brief in the case, wrote that the decision was one which “will
greatly aid the police in their efforts to prevent crime and apprehend criminals.”81 That by its decision the Court had “delivered into the hands of police a very powerful weapon for the prevention and detection of crime.”82
The Terry decision was certainly influenced by the findings of the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of

75.
Id. at 23-24.
76.
Arnold W. Lowey, The Warren Court as Defendant of State and Federal Criminal Laws: A Reply to Those Who Believe That the Court is Oblivious to the Needs of Law
Enforcement, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1218, 1242 (1969).
77.
President’s Comm. on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Task
Force Report: The Police 178-86 (1967).
78.
Id.
79.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
80.
Fred E. Inbau & James R. Thompson, Stop and Frisk: The Power and Obligation of the Police, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 333 (1968).
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
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Justice83 and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Reports for the
United States – 1966.84 The Court stated:
In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the
need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves
and other prospective victims of violence in situations
where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an
officer is justified in believing that the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it
would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer
the power to take necessary measures to determine whether
the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the
threat of physical harm.85
While one might disagree with the Supreme Court’s approach, it is
clear that the Court was, also, substantially affected by information about
the misuse of police power and the effect police investigative activity had
on public perception of the police, particularly in African-American communities across the United States.86
Terry was a retreat from the traditional warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, and a major victory for the police before a Warren
Court, which had expanded defendants' rights (see Mapp v. Ohio,87 Miranda v. Arizona,88 and Gideon v. Wainwright89). Despite accepting a police
practice that had for years been violating the Fourth Amendment rights of
countless Americans, in Terry the Court set boundaries on the use of this
procedure and established rights for those whose personal security was violated in the pursuit of evidence. The application of the exclusionary rule to
violations of what has become known as the “Terry Balancing Test” objective “reasonable and articulable suspicion” standard, and later the “scope
and duration” analysis, restricted police power.

83.
President’s Comm. on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Tas1
Force Report: The Police 178-86 (1967).
84.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 n.21.
85.
Id.
86. Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Bro1en Promises: “The
Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOWARD L.J. 567, 573 (1991).
87. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION

In defining reasonable and articulable suspicion, the Court stated:
“[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . .”90 This conclusion must be subject to specific and
articulable facts, which taken together with reasonable inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion known to the officer at the
inception of the contact with the subject.91
The determination of the officer and his conduct must be subjected to
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstance (totality of the circumstances).92 The Court was insistent that this
must be an objective standard of review: “would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate$”93 As stated above, simple “good faith” alone is not enough.94
On the same day as Terry the Court also decided Sibron v. State of
New York.95 In Sibron, police observed the defendant “hanging out” on a
street corner with known drug dealers and users for a substantial period of
time.96 The police never saw any exchange or heard any conversations between Sibron and the other people.97 The police approached Sibron, and the
officer claimed he saw Sibron make a furtive movement by reaching into
his pocket and discarding drugs.98 None of the officers had any suspicion
that he was armed or that they were in danger.99 Sibron was searched and
drugs were found on him.100
At the hearing on the motion to suppress the State argued that the observed activity and the people with whom Sibron was associating established articulable suspicion.101 The State abandoned any claim that there
was probable cause for the police action.102
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 19-20.
Id.
Id. at 22 n.19.
Id.
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 63.
Sibron, 293 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 45.
Id.
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In response to the State’s position regarding whether reasonable and
articulable suspicion for the initial seizure and subsequent search the Court
stated: “The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable
inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s
personal security.”103
In United States v. Sokolow,104 DEA agents approached the defendant
upon his return to Hawaii.105 The police had been advised by agents in Los
Angeles that the defendant had exhibited the indicia of being a drug courier,
including nervously looking around the waiting area for his flight connection.106 In addition, the agents knew Sokolow had paid $2,100 cash for
round trip tickets to Miami (the ticket agent had alerted the DEA), used a
possible alias, the phone number he had given the ticket agent at the time of
the purchase was in another person’s name (they did not know it was the
defendant’s roommate), he was only in Miami for 48 hours (it was more
than a 20 hour round trip), he appeared nervous, and he had not checked
any luggage.107 After a search, 1,063 grams of cocaine were found in
Sokolow’s possession.108 Sokolow’s motion to suppress was denied, and he
was convicted of possession with intent to distribute the cocaine found in
his possession.109 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeal, in a divided ruling,
found in favor of Sokolow’s claim that the facts did not give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion.110
The Supreme Court stated that the concept of reasonable suspicion,
like probable cause, is not “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set
of legal rules.”111 “The level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.”112 “The level of suspicion
required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable
cause.”113 In determining that the totality of the circumstances supported a
finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion in this case the Court stated:
Any one of these factors [the observations and investigation by the police] is not by itself proof of
any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with in103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 62.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
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nocent travel. But taken together they amount to
reasonable suspicion. . . . We said in Reid v. Georgia . . . “there could, of course be circumstances in
which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”114
But, like in a finding of probable cause, in making a determination of
reasonable and articulable suspicion “the relevant inquiry is not whether
particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.”115
Reasonable and articulable suspicion need not be based upon a police
officer’s personal observations.116 Unprovoked flight at the sight of the police is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate, and “by its very nature, is not
‘going about one’s business’' in fact, it is just the opposite” and can establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion.117
III.

APPLICATION OF TERRY TO AUTOMOBILE STOPS

Automobile stops provided an additional problem. Clearly, vehicle
stops usually involve probable cause that the driver committed a traffic
offense. However, due to the nature of the reason for the stop, the Court has
treated them as “Terry-type” stops.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms118 permits officers to order the driver out of
the vehicle incident to a traffic stop.119 The Court stated that action is “not a
‘serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,’ but it hardly rises to the
level of a ‘petty indignity.’”120 The Court went on to state that the search of
the driver is acceptable if the officer “reasonably concludes the driver is
armed.”121
Maryland v. Wilson122 extended Mimms to passengers because the
threat of a passenger being armed is just as great as the driver.123 Brendlin v.
California124 found that when an automobile is stopped, the officer effectively seizes everyone in the vehicle.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
Id. at 111.
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
Id. at 112 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
Id. at 414.
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
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In Arizona v. Johnson125 the defendant was the passenger in a car
stopped for traffic infractions.126 In observing the defendant’s behavior and
clothing, the police started questioning him.127 After learning Johnson was
from out of town, a member of the Crips, a street gang, and had been in
prison, the officers ordered him out of the car.128 They patted him down and
found a firearm.129 The Court recognized that Mimms, Wilson, and Brendlin
portray Terry’s application in a traffic stop setting, and determined the actions of the police officer were reasonable in the setting of an automobile
stop by meeting the balancing test requirement.130
Although Johnson was not typical of Terry and its progeny in the development of the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard, it gives
evidence of the evolution of the law in this regard. The Court took the opportunity to reconcile and bring cohesiveness to the various permutations
announced over the years.131 Most of all, in noting the same conflicts exist
among Mimms, Brendlin, and Wilson, the Court seemed to be giving even
more alternatives to trial courts in exercising their discretion when determining whether the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the
time of the interaction with a particular person justifies the intrusion into
that person’s privacy rights.
IV.

SCOPE AND DURATION

The requirement that the scope of a search be defined was established
in the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. (emphasis added).132
As we have seen, Terry established the scope of the search in a “stop
and frisk” as being the pat-down of the outer clothing to determine if the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
Id. at 330-33.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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subject is armed.133 In Ybarra v. Illinois134 the defendant was present at a
bar where the police were executing a search warrant.135 For the safety of
the officers, the defendant was patted down and no weapons were found,
however, the officer did feel what seemed to be a cigarette pack in the defendant’s shirt pocket.136 A few minutes later the officer returned, patted
down the defendant again, and seized the cigarette pack, finding drugs inside.137
The Court stated the scope of a Terry frisk allows law enforcement officers, for their own protection and safety, to conduct a pat-down to find
weapons that the officer reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of a suspect. This narrow scope of the permissible search does not
permit a frisk for weapons upon less than a reasonable belief or suspicion
directed at the suspect, even though that suspect happens to be on the premises where an authorized search is taking place.138
In addition, Terry first established the principal of the duration of the
seizure, which has since been attached to the scope of the search.139 By requiring in Terry that the seizure be “brief,” the Court left the definition of
“brief” as open as it did many of the “limitations which the Fourth
Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons.”140
If the determination of the legality of a warrantless seizure, and the
search attendant thereto, is based upon its reasonableness, as the Fourth
Amendment requires, then bright-line rules leave no room for a determination of the reasonableness of an officer’s actions by trial courts. This discretion is reliant upon a court’s ability to judge the credibility of an officer’s
observations in exercising his judgment and using his experience and training, and objectively determines whether the actions of the officer are violative of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Subsequently, however, the Court had to provide better guidance. Essentially, the duration of the search is defined by the scope.141 The duration
is defined by the reasonable time necessary to complete the scope of the
mission.142

133.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
134.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
135.
Id. at 88-89.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
139. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (citing Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)).
140.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
141.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
142.
Id.
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Florida v. Royer143 addressed both scope and duration.144 Believing
Royer fit a drug-courier profile, police officers at Miami International Airport approached Royer and asked several questions.145 They took possession of his identification and his airline ticket.146 While one officer took
Royer to an interrogation room, the other went to the airplane and collected
Royer’s luggage.147 A full search of Royer’s luggage revealed a large quantity of marijuana.148
The Court stated that Terry and its progeny created only a limited exception to the general rule that seizures of the person require probable
cause.149 A reasonable suspicion of a crime is insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interrogation is investigative.150 “The scope
of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. . . . however, it is clear [that] an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.”151
In United States v. Perkins,152 the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals dealt
with duration in the context of an automobile stop. Citing United States v.
Purcell,153 the court stated that:
Terry requires that an officer have an objective,
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Pursuant
to this standard, a traffic stop must be “reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” and may not
last “any longer than necessary to process the traffic violation” unless there is articulable suspicion
of other illegal activity.154
The Supreme Court picked up on this theme in Rodriguez v. United
States.155 Rodriguez was stopped for a traffic offense.156 After giving Ro143. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
144.
Id. at 500.
145.
Id. at 494.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 494-95.
149.
Id. at 499.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965 (11th Cir. 2003).
153.
United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
154.
Perkins, 348 U.S. at 969 (first quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; then quoting United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 196 (11th Cir 1997)).
155.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1609.
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driguez a formal warning, the officer continued to detain Rodriguez for
fifteen minutes while awaiting the arrival of a canine unit to perform an
exterior “dog sniff” of the vehicle in hopes of finding drugs, for which he
had no probable cause, or even reasonable and articulable suspicion, would
be present.157
A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that
violation.158 It is a relatively brief encounter.159 A routine traffic stop is
more analogous to a Terry stop than to a formal arrest.160 “Like
a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
context is,” as stated in Rodriguez v. United States,161 “determined by the
seizure's ‘mission,’ [which is] to address the traffic violation that warranted
the stop162 and attend to related safety concerns.”
Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last
no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. The traffic stop may
last no longer than what is necessary to address the infraction.163 Authority
for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed. Furthermore, authority for the
seizure initiated by the traffic-stop ends when any tasks are, or reasonably
should have been, finished.164 “[I]n determining the reasonable duration of a
stop, ‘it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued
[the] investigation’ that prompted the seizure in the first place.165
Other minor warrantless intrusions have passed Supreme Court scrutiny. In Michigan v. Summers,166 the Court dealt with the detention of the
occupant of a house being searched pursuant to a search warrant issued with
probable cause.167 The Court held that, when a reviewing magistrate is convinced the information provided in an affidavit in support of an application
for a search warrant is sufficient to establish probable cause, evidence of an
offense is not a violation for Fourth Amendment purposes.168 It is constitutionally reasonable to require the occupant to remain while law enforcement

156. Id. at 1612.
157. Id. at 1613.
158.
Id. at 1614.
159. Id.
160.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1609.
161.
Id. at 1614.
162. Id. at 1612-16 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)).
163.
Id. at 1614.
164.
Id.
165.
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
686 (1985)).
166.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
167.
Id. at 694-95.
168. Id. at 705
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officers execute the warrant to search the person’ s home.169 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court held that even though there is no probable cause for
the arrest of the suspect (until after obtaining evidence from the search), for
Fourth Amendment purposes, “a warrant to search for contraband founded
on probable cause [the scope] implicitly carries with it the limited authority
to detain the occupants at the premises while a proper search is conducted
[the duration].”170
Segura v. United States171 presented a slightly different situation. Police suspected the defendant was selling drugs out of his apartment.172 After
observing and arresting two people the police believed had just purchased
drugs from the defendant, and obtaining a statement from one of the arrestees implicating the defendant in the purchase of the drugs found on the
informant, police officers went to Segura’s apartment, forcibly entered, and
arrested and removed him and his girlfriend from the premises.173 The officers then occupied the apartment for nineteen hours while awaiting the
issuance of a search warrant.174
The Court approved the subsequent warrant and search by determining
that the officers acted in good faith with the purpose of maintaining the
status quo. 175 “[The] securing of the premises under these circumstances
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, at least when undertaken to preserve the status quo while a search warrant is being sought.”176
Illinois v. McArthur177 is similar in application to Segura. A police officer’s refusal to allow the defendant to enter his residence without a police
officer accompanying him until a search warrant for the residence was obtained, following a statement by the defendant's wife that her husband had
illegal drugs in residence, was a “reasonable seizure” that did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.178 The decision was based upon the fact that the
officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had illegal drugs in the
residence and reason to fear destruction of the evidence, and thus the restriction was limited in time (duration) and scope.179
With the development of good faith in the guise of exceptions in the
enforcement of the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard,180 the
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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Id. at 704.
Id. at 705.
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
Id. at 799.
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Segura, 468 U.S. at 809.
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survival of Rodriguez and the application of scope and duration to Terry
automobile cases and other areas of application has to be in question. Rodriguez was a recent six to three decision,181 and although the addition of
Justice Gorsuch replacing the late Justice Antonin Scalia does not change
the ideological “balance” of the Court prior to Scalia’s death, the survival
of Rodriguez has to be called into question. Justice Scalia's general disdain
for unwarranted searches and continued efforts to protect the historical
trespassory search doctrine as the true measure of a Fourth Amendment
violation may not be as important to Justice Gorsuch and those justices
leaning toward a more liberal use of the good faith exception.
V.

THE TERRY BALANCING TEST, SPECIAL NEEDS SEARCHES, AND
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF DIMINISHMENT

The third underpinning of Terry was the balancing test created by the
Court in determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable. In simple
terms, the test requires the Court to balance the governmental interest
against the degree of intrusion by the authority upon the personal security
of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy: “there is ‘no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or
seize) against the invasion of which the search (or seizure) entails.’”182
According to the Court, this test is meaningless unless “it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can
be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances.”183 Nowhere does this become more evident than
in the Court’s analysis of special needs and administrative searches conducted under statutory schemes created by the state and federal legislatures.
As discussed below these types of searches range from drug testing of
federal and state employees 184 to schoolchildren,185 inventory searches,186
administrative inspections of highly regulated industries, and DUI187 and
border checkpoints.188 As shown, each of these have been approved or disapproved based upon this balancing of interests.
181. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612.
182.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 53637 (1967)).
183. Id. at 21.
184
Skinner v. Ry Labor Execs.' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat'l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
185.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976).
186. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
187. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
188.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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Terry is not specifically cited in the leading cases regarding inventory
searches,189 however, the use of the balancing of interests was instrumental
in the initial approval of inventories by the Court in South Dakota v.
Opperman,190 followed by Illinois v. Lafayette,191 and Colorado v.
Bertine.192
In Opperman, the Court held that an inventory search might be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause.193 The Court assessed the
reasonableness of an inventory search of the glove compartment of an
abandoned automobile impounded by the police.194 They found that inventory procedures serve to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police; to insure against claim of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property; and to guard the police from danger.195 In light of the strong governmental interests and the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile, the Court upheld the search.196
In Lafayette, at the jailhouse, the police inventoried the contents of a
shoulder bag taken from the possession of an individual being taken into
custody.197 The Court found that the legitimate governmental interest was
the same as that approved in Opperman.198
Bertine dealt not with an abandoned vehicle or a handbag on the person of the defendant, but the impounding of a vehicle after an arrest supported by probable cause.199
In this case, the defendant was arrested for DUI and his van was inventoried before being towed to the impound lot.200 The inventory revealed
the presence of controlled substances.201 In his motion to suppress, Bertine

189.
The use of the term “inventory search” is an oxymoron. If a “search” is conducted, it is an action by an authority to obtain evidence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8. The Court’s
justification for approval of inventories is for the protection of the officer and the owner of
the vehicle against claims of destroyed or missing items seized during the inventory. Id. at
12. The Court has stated more than once that the purpose of the inventory cannot be evidentiary, but fulfilling the purpose, which justifies the inventory. Id. at 29.
190.
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alleged the search of the closed backpack and containers exceeded the permissible scope of such a search under the Fourth Amendment.202
Affirming the principles in Opperman and Lafayette, the Court determined that reasonable police regulations related to inventory procedures
administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though
Courts might, as a matter of hindsight, be able to devise equally reasonable
rules requiring a different procedure:
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and some containers, in
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.203
In both Opperman and Lafayette, the police must be operating pursuant to established procedures meant to fulfill the governmental interest in
the least intrusive way that impedes upon the privacy interests of the citizen.204 In Florida v. Wells,205 the Court stated: “The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are
turned into a ‘purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of a
crime.’”206
Drug testing presented another challenge to an individual’s personal
security. The criteria for approval (or disapproval) of such testing are established in the following series of four decisions.
In 1989, two decisions, +at’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab207
and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’Assn.,208 settled the issue that drug tests
required by the statute are searches. Each balances the individual’s privacy
expectations against the government’s interests to determine whether it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in
the particular context.
In Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration established regulations that required blood and urine tests of rail employees involved in train
accidents or had violated certain safety rules.209 There was clear documented evidence of drug and alcohol abuse by some railroad employees and the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
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Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
Id. at 1.
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Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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obvious safety hazards of such abuse.210 The Court recognized that urinalysis invaded certain privacy rights.211 In balancing against those rights was
the reduced intrusiveness of the procedure, and that these employees, solely
by being engaged in a highly regulated industry, which was charged with
the public safety, had a diminished expectation of privacy.212
The Court, in eschewing any need for any particularized suspicion and
setting forth the governmental interest, found, that in addition to the safety
interests, such drug tests could deter illegal drug use by railroad employees,
workers positioned to cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors, outweighed the degree of intrusion
on the employees’ expectation (though diminished) of privacy.213
In Von Raab, the Court sustained a United States Customs Service
program that made drug testing a condition for those employees who held
positions directly involving drug interdiction or requiring the employee to
carry a firearm.214 Just as in Skinner, there was no question the drug testing
requirement was an invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectation of
privacy.215
In approving the treasury department regulations, the Court, just as in
Skinner, felt that the governmental interest outweighed the degree of intrusion.216 The governmental interest was that work which directly involves
drug interdiction and/or the carrying of a firearm pose grave safety threats
to employees who hold those positions and also expose them to large
amounts of illegal narcotics and persons involved in the drug trade.217 An
employee who is using illicit drugs could be susceptible to ambivalence to
his responsibilities, and tempted by bribes, or threatened with blackmail.218
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton dealt with another aspect of drug testing: students involved in interscholastic athletic competitions.219 The Court
recognized the critical duty (governmental interest) the government bears
under a public school system, as a guardian and tutor of children entrusted
to its care.220 Evidence clearly established a “sharp increase in drug use” in
the respondent school district, in which the athletes were not only users, but
leaders in the local drug culture.221
210.
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Id. at 647.
Id. at 649.

66

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38-1

The Court recognized that students have a lesser expectation of privacy than the general population.222 In finding that the governmental interest
outweighed the degree of intrusion of the students’ personal security, the
Court decided the testing would act as a deterrence of drug use by the students and reduce the risk of injury to the athletes, teammates, and opponents.223
All three of these decisions were central in the Court’s decision in
Chandler v. Miller224 in overturning a Georgia statute requiring candidates
for statewide office to submit to drug testing before, and as part of, qualifying to be placed on the ballot.225 The state, in an attempt to ameliorate the
privacy issue, set up a scheme where the candidate would be drug tested
privately by a state-authorized laboratory, and the results would only become public, if or when, the candidate attempted to file qualification documents to be placed on the ballot.226
The statute was challenged by the libertarian candidate for governor.227
In addition to the minimally invasive testing, Chandler claimed the scheme
also invaded his obvious First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.228 The Court believed the issue was whether the special needs showing of a legitimate governmental interest was established.229
The State of Georgia argued that the governor’s and other statewide
officers’ use of illicit drugs would jeopardize the discharge of public functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts, and undermine public
confidence and trust in elected officials.230 The Court determined that this
certification requirement was not designed to identify candidates who violate antidrug laws, nor would it deter illegal drug users from seeking public
office.231 They saw no reason why ordinary law enforcement could not deal
with any issue that may arise.232
In closing, the Court made the following statement recognizing the
balancing test and its application:
We reiterate, too, that where the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’–for example,
222.
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searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts
and other official buildings. But where, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how
conveniently arranged.233
Closely regulated industries provided another area where governments
may require persons involved in those type of activities to submit to warrantless searches and seizures. New York v. Burger234 provides the best example of the use of the balancing test to a determination of the efficacy of
such statutory schemes.
Burger owned a junkyard.235 His business consisted of dismantling of
cars and the selling of their parts.236 A New York statute required that an
individual engaged in this business was required to have a license and additionally required that certain records be kept, and:
Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any police officer and during his regular and usual business hours,
a vehicle dismantler shall produce such records and permit
said agent or police officer to examine them and any vehicles or parts of vehicles which are subject to the record
keeping requirements of this section and which are on the
premises . . . .237
Failure to comply was a criminal offense (Class A misdemeanor).238
The Court first found that although the Fourth Amendment was applicable to such searches, the owner or operator of commercial premises in a
closely regulated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, and the
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment have lessened application.239 It found that certain industries have such a history of government
oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such a business.240 A warrantless inspection, however,
even in the context of a heavily regulated business, will be deemed reasonable only so long as three criteria are met.241
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First, there must be a substantial government interest that informs
those involved in the industry of the regulatory scheme pursuant to which
the inspection is made.242 Second, the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme.243 Lastly, the statute’s inspection
program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must
provide constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.244
The New York regulatory scheme satisfied those three criteria.245 The
state established it had a "substantial interest in regulating the vehicledismantling and automobile junkyard industry"246 because of increased vehicle theft and the problem of theft associated with that industry.247 Also,
the regulation reasonably served the State’s substantial interest in dealing
with those thefts.248 Therefore, the state’s interest outweighed the commercial owner and operator’s diminished expectation of privacy and the degree
of the intrusion was minimal in accomplishing the enforcement of the government interests.249
In Maryland v. King,250 the Court reviewed a Maryland statute that required persons who had been arrested on any serious offense to provide
DNA samples whenever they were to be detained in custody.251 The
claimed purpose of this procedure was the governmental interest in properly
identifying defendants before being released on bond.252 King went through
that procedure, and his DNA was compared with the samples obtained from
other serious crimes.253 It matched, and he was arrested on charges related
to the matches.254 The DNA evidence was admitted at trial.255
King claimed that the procedure of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA
sample violated the Fourth Amendment and his reasonable expectation of
privacy.256 The Court found that with the significant improvement in testing
of DNA, the procedure met a legitimate government interest in assisting the
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244.
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criminal justice system and police, much like fingerprinting and photographing.257
In balancing the reasonableness of this procedure against the intrusion
upon arrestee’s privacy rights, the Court gave great weight to the significant
governmental interest at stake in the identification of arrestees and the DNA
identification to unmatched DNA evidence potential to serving those interests.258 They found that the intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain the sample
was minimal and that an arrestee’s privacy interest is greatly diminished.259
All three of these cases are not instances of criminal investigations.
They are special needs searches outside the scope of criminal enforcement.
However, they are clear examples of the slippery slope of diminishing the
true balance expressed in Terry, in which the Court has engaged.
The results contradict the purposes in Burger. Police officers, not
regulators, determined, not that Burger had failed to comply with the regulatory requirements, but that Burger had violated other statutes relating to
possession of stolen property (the automobiles). In King, the claimed purpose for identification of King as being who he said he was for bond purposes, was a subterfuge for the real purpose: gathering DNA to be matched
against known samples. Thus, the intrusion far exceeded the stated governmental interest. In each case, it was a search for criminal evidence.
VI.

TERRY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF “CHECKPOINTS”

In approving border checkpoints and traffic checkpoints, the Court relied upon the Terry Balancing Test to justify warrantless and suspicionless
seizures without suspicion, which the Court deemed in the public interest
(government intrusion) and outweighed the degree of the intrusion in citizens’ lives.260
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,261 the border patrol had set up a
checkpoint sixty-six miles north of the Mexican border near San Clemente.262 Every car was warned one mile south of the checkpoint that “ALL
VEHICLES, STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE.”263 The purpose of the checkpoint
was to engage the occupants of the vehicles in brief questioning and check
for illegal aliens entering the U.S.264

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 1972.
Id. at 1977.
Id. at 1977-78.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Id. at 546.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
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The Court held that such warrantless stops, even when they are not
supported by any particularized suspicion, were consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.265 It further approved referring certain motorists selectively to
a secondary inspection for further questioning about citizenship and immigration status even though they were made largely on a basis of apparent
Mexican ancestry.266
Agreeing “that checkpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment,”267 the Court determined that the governmental
interest in enforcing the restrictions on immigration created by Congress
outweighed the minimal intrusion of the initial contact at the checkpoint.268
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court addressed
the State of Michigan’s establishment of temporary DUI checkpoints.269
The Court confirmed the ruling in Martinez-Fuerte.270 It authorized the
State police scheme based upon the balancing of the interests and sufficient
effectiveness of the State in deterring and apprehending drivers who were
under the influence (governmental interest) against the minimal invasion of
the primary checkpoint lane and the referral to a secondary lane for further
investigation (degree of intrusion).271
VII.

FLOYD V. CITY OF NEW YORK (THE ABUSE OF STOP AND FRISK)

During the mayoral terms of Michael Bloomberg in New York City,
the police engaged in a stop and frisk practice, nicknamed “:ero Tolerance
Policing”, based upon a New ;ork statute,272 which in turn was based upon
Terry. New York Police Department statistics indicate that from 2002 to
2012, an average of one in eight people stopped under the program were
found to have violated the law in some manner and were formerly
charged.273 In 2011 alone, over 684,000 people were subject to stop and
frisk.274 The statistics also indicate that the overwhelming majority of that
265. Id. at 561.
266. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563.
267.
Id. at 556.
268.
Id. at 556.
269.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
270.
Id. at 455.
271. Id. at 451-52.
272.
N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 2010).
273.
Stop and Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 23, 2017),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc23RB-CED7].
274.
Ryan Devereaux, Scrutiny Mounts as +*PD 'Stop and 0ris1’ Searches Hit
Record High, THE GUARDIAN (February 14, 2012, 16:55 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/14/nypd-stop-frisk-record-high
[https://perma.cc/565E-SXMN].
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number were either African-American or Latino.275 As the abuses seemed
to pile up, disapproval of the program by the public grew.276
Four plaintiffs filed a class action against the NYPD and several officials of the City of New York alleging violations of their civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the laws of the State
of New York, claiming that the stop and frisk program was aimed at persons of certain races and nationalities.277
This was not the first challenge to the department’s use of stop and
frisk. In 2003, a settlement was reached in Daniels v. the City of New York,
in which the city agreed to adopt several procedural changes to reduce ethnic and racial disparities in the use of the program.278 These changes were
designed to expose abuses by creating a field investigation card to be filled
out with each contact between the police and the citizenry relating to stop
and frisk.
August 12, 2013, after a bench trial, the trial judge ordered several remedial measures including: the appointment of a monitoring of the use of
stop and frisk by the NYPD; immediate reforms to the program; revisions
to training programs; changes to stop and frisk record keeping; changes to
supervision and discipline; the institution of a pilot project providing for the
use of body cameras; and a joint remedial process to ensure continued
community input.279
The trial court, in ordering those remedial measures, ruled that the police department had violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting unreasonable searches and the Fourteenth Amendment by systematically conducting stops and frisks in a racially discriminatory manner.280 The ruling
of the trial court was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal.281
However, before the matter could be completed, Mayor Bloomberg left

275. Devereaux, supra note 274.
276.
Brent Staples, The Human Cost of ')ero Tolerance’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/the-cost-of-zerotolerance.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/Z445-8YM7]; James Ford, Stop and Frisk: How
Controversial NYPD Practice Affects Real People, WPIX (Mar. 22, 2012).
277.
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
278. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 1:99-cv01695).
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Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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office, and the new mayor announced the city was abandoning the program
and the appeal.282
VIII.

THE ATTACK ON TERRY’S REASONABLE STANDARD IN FAVOR
OF “GOOD FAITH”

It is clear, that even if Terry itself is rarely mentioned, if at all, in these
different applications of the balancing test, the balancing of interests test
established in Terry is the overwhelming basis of the Court’s approval of
many warrantless searches and seizures. This balancing test is one of the
reasons the Court has chosen not to take on cases where Terry’s reasonableness test is sought to be overturned. The Court has chosen instead to
address Terry in terms of establishing exceptions, much as it has done in
warrant cases.
In the past two terms, the Court seems to have adopted such an approach in addressing the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard. We
now address Heien v. North Carolina283 and Utah v. Strieff.284
In Heien, a police officer thought the defendant’s vehicle was “suspicious.”285 He noted that one of the brake lights was not working. He
stopped the vehicle and wrote the driver a warning.286 While issuing the
warning, he became suspicious of the activities of two of the occupants and
the answers to the questions he posed to them.287 During the discussions,
Heien gave consent to the officer to search the vehicle at which time the
officer found cocaine.288
Heien pursued a motion to suppress, alleging that the officer did not
have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to support the seizure of Heien
by way of the stop of his vehicle.289 The basis of this claim was that the
statute relied upon by the officer for the stop required two operating taillights, which Heien’s vehicle had, but required only one operating brake
light, which Heien also had.290
The Court commenced its analysis by stating that the Fourth Amendment requires government officials to act reasonably, not perfectly, and
gives those officials “fair leeway for enforcing the law”291 and that
282.
See PRESS OFFICE OF NEW YORK CITY, TRANSCRIPT: MAYOR BILL
ANNOUNCES AGREEMENT IN LANDMARK STOP-AND-FRISK CASE (2014).
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Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
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Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
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Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534.
286.
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Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534.
291. Id. at 536 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)).
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“[s]earches and seizures based upon mistakes of fact may be reasonable.”292
However, the standard was announced as the mistake of reasonable men,
not reasonable trained police officers.
Heien argued that mistake of law and mistake of fact are not the
same.293 The standard for their application is different, and the maxim “Ignorance of the law is no excuse”294 should apply.295 It was “fundamentally
unfair to let police officers get away with mistakes of law when the citizenry is accorded no such leeway.”296
Heien argued that a number of the Court’s decisions have examined
“the reasonableness of an officer’s legal error in the course of considering
the appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation, [not necessarily]
whether there was a violation at all.”297
Mistake of law can be accepted as a defense to prosecution; however,
in this case, the Court determined that, even if the state has incorrectly interpreted the law, or as in this case, did not know the law, the officer’s reasonable and honest belief was sufficient to avoid the dictates of Terry’s
reasonable, articulable suspicion for an unlawful seizure.298
In determining where to put this case in our syllabi to teach to Criminal Procedure students, my colleagues and I struggled on how to label such
an exception. For myself, I could only use the concept of “good faith” as an
explanation. Good faith is a subjective examination of the officer’s state of
mind, as opposed to the objective examination of the facts as they existed at
the inception of the contact between the officer and the suspect.
Under Heien, if an officer is to be said to be acting reasonably when he
is trained in the law but makes a mistake of law, then he is acting on a
“good faith” basis. To show the Court’s attack on reasonableness application to warrantless searches as Terry defined it, one need only remember
that Terry specifically eschewed the application of “good faith” as a basis
for justifying a warrantless seizure.299
The facts of Utah v. Strieff 300 are even more direct. A police officer,
based upon a tip that a house was being used as a “drug house,” performed
periodic surveillance.301 Seeing no independent proof or even articulable
292.
Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–86 (1990)).
293.
Id. at 539
294.
Id. at 540
295.
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540.
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Id. at 539 (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240 (2011); Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1987); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).
298.
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suspicion to support the tip, he nonetheless, on a hunch, approached Strieff
upon seeing him exit the house with hopes of gaining information on the
activities in the house.302
The officer asked Strieff for his name and immediately radioed for a
warrants check on the hope one would be pending.303 Strieff had a parking
ticket warrant; the officer immediately arrested Strieff and found drugs on
him pursuant to a search incident to the arrest.304
Throughout the entire litigation, including before the Supreme Court,
the State of Utah conceded that at the time the officer approached Strieff, he
did not have any reasonable and articulable suspicion to approach Strieff.305
The case turned in the lower court on the issue of attenuation as defined and
applied per United States v. Wong Sun.306307 The Utah Supreme Court had
found that there was no attenuation, since the whole encounter took but a
few minutes, and it saw no break in the chain of events leading to Strieff’s
arrest.308
In what many observers thought was a surprise five to three decision,309 the Court found there was attenuation and the warrant itself was the
attenuation.310 In stating that the officer’s errors in judgment hardly rise to a
purposeful violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights, and not denying
that the officer’s purpose or the flagrancy were a violation of those rights in
the seizure, Justice Thomas, nonetheless stated that these violations did not
rise “to the level of misconduct to warrant suppression.”311
One can only read those words to mean: it was misconduct, but what
the officer did was not bad enough for suppression, and it was for the right
reasons. Terry was clear that the encounter between the officer and the citizen must be reasonable at its inception, not justified by the result.312
Justice Sotomayor in closing a blistering dissent stated: “By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double consciousness, this case tells eve302. Id. at 2060.
303.
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304.
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ryone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your
legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion while
courts excuse the violation of your rights.”313
Addressing the deterrent effect of Terry and the exclusionary rule, Justice Kagan, with Justice Ginsberg concurring, wrote in her dissent:
If the officer believes that any evidence he discovers will
be inadmissible, he is likely to think the unlawful stop not
worth making—precisely the deterrence the exclusionary
rule is meant to achieve. But when he is told of today’s decision? Now the officer knows that the stop may well yield
admissible evidence: So long as the target is one of the
many millions of people in this country with an outstanding
arrest warrant, anything the officer finds in a search is fair
game for use in a criminal prosecution. The officer’s incentive to violate the Constitution thus increases: From here
on, he sees potential advantage in stopping individuals
without reasonable suspicion—exactly the temptation the
exclusionary rule is supposed to remove.314
One has to wonder why the Court reached so far down to grant certiorari in the first place, if not to peripherally attack Terry. Remember, Justice
Scalia was part of the Court that voted to accept the case.315
The Court appears to be taking aim at the reasonable and articulable
suspicion standard itself. By its dicta, the majority clearly wanted to send a
message that the concept of justification at the inception may not be the
standard they intend to consider in the future.316
Discussed below is a brief survey of cases before certain circuit courts
of appeal, which reveal several matters pending before those courts. Some
of which were litigated in the trial courts after Strieff was decided, which
present the courts with Strieff type good faith issues. Two of these, if they
reach the Supreme Court could give the Court more areas upon which to
create exceptions to the effect of violations of Terry’s reasonable and articulable standard.
United States v. Felix recently decided by the Eleventh Circuit is particularly disturbing.317 The matter revolves around a stop of a “black man
313.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070.
314.
Id. at 2073-74.
315.
Id. (Certiorari was granted on October 1, 2015. Justice Scalia died on February
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wearing a black shirt,”318 after a BOLO was issued in response to an armed
robbery of two individuals of their keys and wallets.319
The victims stated that two black men in their early twenties, wearing
black shirts were involved, and they had fled running on foot in an easterly
direction.320 Approximately ten minutes later, and almost half a mile south
of scene of the offense, a police officer spotted the defendant walking alone
in a southerly direction.321 The officer, who was driving on the opposite
side of the street divided by a median strip, turned on his blue and red
emergency lights, made a U-turn, crossed the median strip, and pulled up to
Felix.322 Felix immediately dropped to his knees and called his mother on
his cell phone, in an obvious submission to the show of authority by the
officer.323
The officer exited his vehicle and immediately handcuffed Felix and
frisked him, finding a handgun.324 A further search revealed cocaine in the
possession of the defendant.325
An investigation determined Felix had nothing to do with the armed
robbery.326 However, Felix was charged with being a felon in possession of
a firearm in violation of and possession of cocaine.
Felix filed a motion to suppress alleging the officer did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to approach and seize him.327 The only
cause articulated by the officer was Felix was wearing a black shirt, was an
African-American male and he was in a high crime area of the city of Fort
Meyers, Florida.328 In addition to arguing that there was reasonable and
articulable suspicion for the officer’s actions, the government also argued
that the officer had exercised “excellent judgment.”329
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court found that these factors, and Felix’s nervousness upon the officer approaching him, were
enough to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion. Furthermore,
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Felix’s action of dropping to his knees was a form of consent to the seizure
resulting in the officer’s subsequent actions.330
This case had presented the possibility of the Eleventh Circuit determining that, even if a reasonable and articulable suspicion did not exist, the
defendant’s conduct subsequent to the seizure by acceding to the authority
of the officer before actually being confronted, and the “excellent judgment” exercised by the officer created a totality of circumstances, like those
in Strieff, which do not rise to the level of suppression. However, the court
avoided this issue by finding that simply being a black man walking on the
street a half mile from the scene of a crime, wearing a black shirt created a
reasonable and articulable suspicion for the officer's actions. Was this an
avoidance of having to confront good faith? Is this the type of "reasonable
and articulable suspicion" Terry contemplated? Was the court's decision
tainted by concern for the effect of a Strieff type decision?
In United States v. Ronald Allen Class, Class, who was known to police and the specific officer in question, as a “meth dealer” was with another
male working on a motor vehicle with its hood up, and was legally parked
on the street.331 With no indication that any criminal activity was afoot, or
belief that Class was armed, the officer pulled up behind the parked vehicle
and approached Class and the other male.332
After some brief conversation, the officer asked Class to step away
from the vehicle and stated he was going to pat him down. Nothing was
found in his outer clothing, but the officer then reached into the Class’ pants
pocket and took a package of marijuana out of the pocket.333 The officer
then placed Class under arrest, put him in the back of the police vehicle,
walked up to the front of the parked vehicle the defendant had been repairing, and looked in the exposed engine compartment, looking for, and finding more drugs.334 After being advised of his Miranda rights, Class was
questioned, and told the officer the drugs were his and that there was another firearm in the vehicle.335

330. Felix, 2017 WL 880521 (In addition, the trial Court made the determination that
although the defendant was actually 32 years old, he appeared much younger than he was
and could have been mistaken for a younger man. This was a factor not considered or known
to the officer upon the inception of his contact with the defendant and thus is irrelevant to
whether reasonable and articulable suspicion existed).
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Class was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.336 His motion to suppress the weapons and his statements was denied,
despite the court concurring with Class that reasonable and articulable suspicion did not exist at the inception of the contact with him, or for the patdown that resulted in the first drugs being found.337 The trial court relied
upon the “plain view doctrine” of finding the drugs in the engine well of the
vehicle as attenuating the illegal seizure, and everything that occurred
thereafter was as a result of a lawful arrest.338
The defendant entered a conditional plea to preserve his appeal on the
motion to suppress.339 His brief has been filed with the Eighth Circuit.340
The government has yet to answer. It is anticipated, that in light of the trial
court’s determination that reasonable an articulable suspicion did not exist
prior to the pat-down and search, the government will rely upon Strieff to
support the trial court’s use of plain view to justify the officer’s actions.
Will the Eighth Circuit use plain view as an attenuation fitting Strieff’s
rationale$ Will it sanction a police officer’s conduct of approaching someone without any reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot, just because the person is known to the officer as having been convicted of a prior offense and seize that person, all in hopes of finding something criminal to justify an arrest or further search? Is this not what Strieff
seems to permit, and if so, will “plain view” be a form of attenuation similar to the finding of a parking violation warrant?
To be sure, the Eleventh Circuit is one of the most “conservative” in
the country. If the questions above are open to an answer in the affirmative,
will the Supreme Court grant certiorari and be willing to start differentiating between exceptions, and which doctrines are applicable to excuse police
misconduct?
IV. CONCLUSION
Heien diminished a person’s personal security by allowing officers to
make mistakes in the enforcement of the law, and the prosecution still benefit from the encounter to the detriment of the person seized. Strieff opened
the door to officers ignoring the dictates of Terry’s admonition against
“good faith” or “hunches” and burying the violation of a person’s personal
security in the result of the search. This thought process is an avoidance of
336. Id.
337.
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Terry’s requirement that there must be reasonable and articulable suspicion
at the inception of the contact.
In today’s supercharged partisan atmosphere, and, with the assent of
Justice Gorsuch to the Court to replace Justice Scalia, on the issues surrounding immigration and deportation of “illegal aliens” or “undocumented
immigrants,” Strieff and Heien could give rise to more purposeful acts designed to discover criminal evidence under the guise of immigration status
checks, or vice versa. And where evidence of illegality is discovered, will
the Court apply Strieff to justify those acts in support of criminal charges or
deportation of those persons?
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in the quote above sounds the alarm from
that point of view. The future may hold rulings where the Court approves
instances of stop and identify without even articulable suspicion, as was
required in Hiibel v. Nevada.341 In Hiibel, the Court approved the Nevada
stop and identify statute,342 but where there existed reasonable and articulable suspicion for the initial encounter.
If we apply Strieff, in particular to instances where the police approach
a person without any articulable suspicion or probable cause, simply to determine if they have proof of legal residency status in the United States, and
it is determined they have no such proof on their person, the Court may
approve a search and the fruits thereof, whether it is determined that the
suspect does or does not have a legal basis for entry and remaining in this
country. The use of checkpoints with other facially legitimate purposes, but
being used for immigration status checks, could be sanctioned by the Court
for the same purpose. Officers without true particularized suspicion, beyond
a desire to satisfy their own curiosity, could diminish every citizen’s personal security.
Police officers, no longer being bound by any explanation for their initial confrontation with a citizen on the street, or anywhere for that matter,
can approach that citizen simply because of the clothes they wear, have an
accent, are of color or appear to be of Hispanic, Middle Eastern or Oriental
descent, and demand identification and immigration status papers.343 Even
though that confrontation would be in violation of Terry, and all of its underpinnings, the establishment of an illegal immigration status would act as
a shield against any relief that a person may seek as attenuated or the conduct of the police as not rising to the level of suppression.
Even more disconcerting would be the lack of relief for those who are
wrongfully approached, but do not have a legal immigration status, or
where evidence of criminal offenses is obtained leading to prosecution.
341.
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That gives rise to the police state where officers have unfettered power to
ask for “your papers, please.” One need only remember the warnings of
Terry itself: “If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the
police.”344

344.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.

